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Technology and Pornography 
Dawn C. Nunziato∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade, legislators and industry players have 
undertaken valiant efforts to employ technology to remedy a 
problem that technology has created—the increased availability to 
minors of sexually-themed content on the Internet. Legislative 
efforts to restrict minors’ access to such content have relied on two 
types of technology: adult verification technology and user-based 
software filters. 
Legislation relying upon adult verification technology, like the 
Communications Decency Act (CDA)1 and the Child Online 
Protection Act (COPA),2 attempts to zone Internet speech at its 
source into adult zones and minor zones by requiring content 
providers to ensure that minors are not granted access to harmful-to-
minors material. Such legislation requires that content providers (1) 
segregate out their harmful-to-minors content, and (2) employ adult 
verification tools like adult identification cards or credit cards to 
ensure that minors are not granted access to such material. 
The constitutionality of such zoning schemes depends on (1) the 
level of sophistication, efficacy, and deployment of adult verification 
technology and (2) the burdens that the required use of such 
technology imposes on content providers and Internet end users.3 
And, as with all content-based restrictions on speech, the 
constitutionality of such schemes depends on whether there are less 
restrictive but equally effective alternatives for achieving the 
 
 ∗ Assoc. Professor, George Washington University Law School, B.A., M.A. 
(Philosophy), J.D., University of Virginia. I am grateful to Dean Frederick Lawrence for his 
generous financial support and to Professor Cheryl Preston for her comments on earlier drafts 
of this Article. I am also grateful to Christopher Chapman, Michelle Rosenthal, and Bryan 
Mechell for excellent research assistance and to Matthew Braun for excellent library research 
assistance. 
 1. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2000). 
 2. 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2000). 
 3. See infra Part III. 
NUNZIATO.FIN 2/4/2008 9:38 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2007 
1536 
government’s interest. For example, challengers to both the CDA 
and COPA pointed to the availability of software filters as less 
restrictive and (at least) equally effective alternatives.4 
Legislation relying upon software filters to restrict minors’ access, 
like the Child Internet Protection Act (CIPA),5 does not regulate 
content providers at all, but instead regulates Internet end users (or 
intermediaries like public schools, libraries, or Internet service 
providers (ISPs)), and essentially requires that these entities employ 
filtering software to restrict minors’ access to harmful Internet 
content. As discussed below, the constitutionality of such filtering 
schemes depends on the sophistication of the filtering software, the 
extent to which it underblocks and/or overblocks users’ access to 
harmful content, and the burdens that the required use of such 
filtering technology imposes on Internet end users. 
The existence and efficacy of filtering technology have presented 
a double-edged sword for legislators in their efforts to regulate 
minors’ access to sexually-themed content. If technology like 
software filters is found to be less restrictive than the adult 
verification-based zoning schemes embodied in the CDA and 
COPA, then the Supreme Court will likely strike down such schemes 
because they are not sufficiently tailored to address the government 
interest. Indeed, given their availability and comparative 
effectiveness, COPA opponents have heralded software filters as a 
less restrictive alternative—reason alone to strike down the statute. 
If, as some have argued, software filters are less speech-restrictive 
than, and at least as effective as, the criminal prohibitions on speech 
embodied in Internet zoning schemes like COPA, then such 
legislation will fail strict scrutiny. 
Recently, an organization called CP80 proposed a different 
means of using filtering-type technology to zone the Internet.6 
Under this proposal, all Internet content would be classified by 
content providers into one of two categories: “Adult/Harmful to 
Minors” or “Not Harmful to Minors.” Certain Internet “ports,” the 
rough equivalent of channels on television, would be designated as 
Adult Ports and used for the transmission of adult content, while 
 
 4. See infra text accompanying notes 60–62, 73. 
 5. 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(5), (6) (2000). 
 6. See Cheryl B. Preston, Making Family-friendly Internet a Reality: The Internet 
Community Ports Act, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1471. 
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others would be designated as Community Ports and used for the 
dissemination of all other content. Individual Internet users would 
then direct their ISPs to provide Internet content to them either on 
all ports (Adult and Community) or only on Community Ports.7 
Proponents contend that this legislative solution is superior not only 
to previous attempts at zoning the Internet but also to previous 
efforts relying on software filtering technology.8 
This Article scrutinizes the various attempts to use technology to 
remedy the problem of minors’ access to sexually-themed content on 
the Internet, with an emphasis on the relationship between the status 
of technology and the constitutionality of the government’s efforts. 
The more effective user-based filtering technology becomes in 
restricting minors’ access to sexually-themed content, the less likely 
courts are to uphold other legislative means of restricting minors’ 
access to such content. In several leading cases, the Supreme Court 
has emphasized that the effectiveness of user-based filtering software 
as an alternative renders the government regulation under 
consideration constitutionally infirm. Part II of the Article analyzes 
the foundational First Amendment jurisprudence defining obscene 
speech and the regulation of minors’ access to sexually-themed 
content. Part III then examines the fate of Congress’s recent efforts 
to regulate in this area, emphasizing in particular the current status 
of COPA, the constitutionality of which has been under 
consideration by the courts for the past ten years. Part IV analyzes 
the constitutionality of the proposed Internet Community Ports Act 
(ICPA) in light of the constitutional scrutiny that courts have 
imposed upon prior efforts to regulate minors’ access to sexually-
themed content and the burdens the Act would impose on content 
providers and Internet users. 
 
 7. See CP80 Foundation, Solutions: Technology, http://www.cp80.org/solutions/ 
technology (last visited January 10, 2008). 
 8. At the time of writing, the ICPA had not yet been introduced in either house of 
Congress. See CP80 Foundation & Cheryl B. Preston, The Internet Community Ports Act of 
2007, http://www.cp80.org/resources/0000/0013/Internet_Community_Ports_Act.pdf; see 
also Preston, supra note 6, at 1471 app. 
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II. THE FOUNDATIONAL FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
A. Defining Obscene Speech 
Over the past fifty years, the Supreme Court has finely honed its 
obscenity jurisprudence9 and its derivative jurisprudence of 
obscenity-for-minors.10 While “obscene”11 speech, properly defined, 
is wholly outside First Amendment protection for any and all 
speakers and listeners, “obscene-for-minors”12 (or “harmful-to-
minors”) speech is that speech which only adults have a 
constitutional right to access (and engage in). The government has a 
legitimate13 interest in restricting underage access to “obscene-for-
minors” speech, but it does not have a legitimate interest in 
restricting adult access to such speech. Therefore, in order to restrict 
adults’ access to sexually-themed content, such content must be 
found to satisfy the constitutional definition of obscenity.14 
Several principles follow from this basic structure of First 
Amendment jurisprudence regarding sexually-themed speech.15 First, 
adults have a constitutional right to access (non-obscene) sexual 
content that falls into the category of obscene-for-minors speech, 
while minors do not. Second, the definitions of “obscene” and 
“obscene for minors” speech take on critical importance, as they 
separate First Amendment-protected content from unprotected 
content. Third, because of the differences in the relevant First 
Amendment rights accorded to minors and adults, the ability to 
determine the age of the individual seeking access to content is of 
critical importance. Because the definitions of “obscene” and 
 
 9. See infra text accompanying notes 18–28. 
 10. See infra Part II.B. 
 11. See infra text accompanying notes 16–18. 
 12. See infra text accompanying notes 33–34. 
 13. As described infra, it is unclear precisely what type of showing needs to be made by 
the government in regulating minors’ access to sexually-themed expression. 
 14. See infra text accompanying notes 16–18. Sexually-oriented content can also be 
restricted if it constitutes child pornography. Because it raises separate issues and developed 
within a distinct line of First Amendment jurisprudence, the discussion of Congress’s efforts to 
restrict access to child pornography on the Internet is left to others. See, e.g., Symposium, The 
Fate of the Child Pornography Protection Act of 1996, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1993 (2002). 
 15. This analysis of obscenity and obscenity-for-minors law substantially tracks my 
analysis in Dawn C. Nunziato, Toward a Constitutional Regulation of Minors’ Access to 
Harmful Internet Speech, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 121 (2004). 
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“obscene-for-minors” speech delineate unprotected speech from 
protected speech, these definitions are also of critical constitutional 
importance. After struggling for decades to define a meaningful test 
for distinguishing protected sexually-themed speech from 
unprotected obscene speech,16 the Supreme Court set forth this test 
in Miller v. California in 1973.17 In order for sexually-themed 
speech to fall outside the protection of the First Amendment for 
adults, Miller requires that: 
(1) the average person, applying contemporary community 
standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to 
the prurient interest; 
(2) the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual 
conduct specifically defined by applicable state law; and 
(3) the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value.18 
In the years following this decision, the Supreme Court 
repeatedly emphasized that Miller set forth the definitive standard 
for regulating obscene speech.19 It is therefore important to focus 
carefully on each of the three prongs of this test. If sexually-themed 
expression falls outside Miller’s definition of obscene speech, adults 
enjoy a right to access it,20 which the government cannot 
constitutionally restrict or substantially burden. 
Miller makes clear that obscenity is to be judged by a local 
community standard, in particular, that of the average member of 
the community, to assess whether the expression at issue, taken as a 
whole, appeals to the prurient interest.21 This prong of the Miller 
test grants local (geographically-defined) communities the autonomy 
 
 16. Other categories of unprotected speech include “fighting words” and “defamation.” 
See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992) (confining unprotected 
speech to limited categories such as fighting words, defamation, and obscenity). 
 17. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
 18. Id. at 24. 
 19. See, e.g., Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S, 497, 498 (1987); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 
153, 155 (1974). 
 20. This is assuming that the sexually-themed expression also does not fall within a 
constitutional definition of child pornography, which is another category of unprotected 
speech. See supra note 14. 
 21. Miller, 413 U.S. at 30–31. 
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to draw the line between sexually-themed speech that is to be 
protected by the First Amendment within and for their respective 
communities, and sexually-themed speech that is to be deemed 
outside of the First Amendment’s protection within and with respect 
to their communities.22 Thus, although it might reasonably be 
believed that the First Amendment sets forth a national standard of 
protection for expression, in the context of regulating sexually-
themed speech, the Supreme Court’s obscenity jurisprudence grants 
local communities the autonomy to determine what subset of such 
speech (if any) is to be deemed outside the protection of the First 
Amendment within and with respect to their communities. 
An inevitable concomitant of such community autonomy is the 
potential geographical variation in the classification of speech as 
obscene. Accordingly, the community of Salt Lake City may classify 
as obscene and unprotected expression that may be deemed 
protected and not obscene by the community of New York City. In 
Miller, the Supreme Court acknowledged the inevitable geographic 
variability of its definition of obscenity: 
[O]ur Nation is simply too big and too diverse . . . to reasonably 
expect that such standards [of prurient interest] could be 
articulated for all 50 states in a single formulation. . . . To require a 
State to structure obscenity proceedings around evidence of a 
national “community standard” would be an exercise in 
futility . . . . It is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read 
the First Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or 
Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in 
Las Vegas or New York City . . . . People in different States vary in 
their tastes and attitudes, and this diversity is not to be strangled by 
the absolutism of imposed uniformity.23 
Accordingly, Miller affirmatively establishes that local 
communities enjoy the prerogative to determine what sexually-
themed expression is to be deemed obscene within their 
communities. In addition, Miller grants local communities the 
autonomy to determine what sexually-themed expression is to be 
deemed protected within their communities. 
 
 22. But see Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 586–613 (2002) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring and Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing for a national community standard for 
obscenity for regulating the Internet). 
 23. Miller, 413 U.S. at 30–33. 
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Second, Miller requires that the government regulator 
specifically set forth a list of sexual acts, the depictions of which are 
unprotected if they are deemed, applying contemporary community 
standards, to be patently offensive.24 The requirement that regulators 
set forth this list with specificity helps to reduce the potential for 
vagueness within obscenity statutes.25 This specific determination of 
patent offensiveness, like the determination of appeal to the prurient 
interest, is also to be made by the average member of the local 
community.26 Thus, under Miller, both the assessment of appeal to 
the prurient interest, and the assessment of patent offensiveness, are 
inevitably subject to geographic variability. 
Local communities’ autonomy to make such determinations is 
not unfettered, however. In assessing local determinations of 
obscene speech, the third prong of Miller requires that appellate 
courts retain the power to determine whether such speech 
nonetheless has redeeming social value—i.e., literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific—and therefore, whether such speech is 
protected by the First Amendment regardless of the local 
community’s assessment.27 Because this determination is not made 
by jury members, “the serious value requirement ‘allows appellate 
courts to impose some limitations and regularity on the definition 
[of obscenity] by setting, as a matter of law, a national floor for 
socially redeeming value.’”28 
In short, Miller embodies a principle of geographical variability 
of the definition of obscene expression. Each community enjoys the 
autonomy to determine whether sexually-themed expression is to be 
 
 24. Id. at 24. 
 25. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 873 (1997). 
 26. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 576 n.7 (majority opinion). 
 27. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 162–63 (1974). 
 28. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 579 (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 873). Thus, even if 
a less “tolerant” community made the determination that the book The Joy of Sex was obscene 
and unprotected by the First Amendment, Miller requires that such determinations be second-
guessed by the judicial branch, which has the responsibility of applying this Miller savings 
clause to declare that the expression at issue nonetheless has serious redeeming social value and 
is therefore protected by the First Amendment. See, e.g., Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 160–61 (1974). 
Accordingly, despite the fact that a local jury in Georgia, applying its state obscenity statute, 
determined that the Academy Award-winning film Carnal Knowledge appealed to the prurient 
interest and described sexually-themed conduct in a patently offensive manner, the court in 
that case had the power to determine that the work nonetheless embodied serious literary 
value. The court was therefore able to rescue the film from the jury’s classification of it as 
obscene and unprotected by the First Amendment. Id. 
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declared obscene and unprotected, or non-obscene and protected, 
within the geographical boundaries of that community. 
Determinations of obscenity made by communities, however, are 
subject to an appellate court’s determination that such content is 
nonetheless protected because it has serious social value. 
B. Defining Obscene-for-Minors Speech 
In Ginsberg v. New York29 and related cases,30 the Supreme Court 
confirmed that legislators may constitutionally restrict minors’ access 
to sexually-themed speech that is protected for adults, so long as 
they are careful not to restrict adults’ rights (including adults’ rights 
as parents)31 within such legislation. The Supreme Court upheld the 
seemingly common-sense principle32 that minors’ First Amendment 
right to access sexually-themed content is more limited than adults’ 
right to access such material. In this case, the Court upheld a New 
York statute that regulated minors’ access to content that fell within 
the statute’s definition of “obscene for minors.”33 The statute at 
issue, which was primarily aimed at restricting the sale of so-called 
“girlie” magazines to minors, prohibited the sale to those ages 
sixteen and under of material that was considered obscene as to that 
age category, even though it would not be obscene to adults.34 The 
statute attempted to conform with Supreme Court precedent at the 
time that required the inclusion of a savings clause for regulations of 
obscene speech. Thus, the statute allowed for speech that had 
redeeming social importance to minors, as well as a community 
standards component for determining whether the expression was 
patently offensive.35 
In affirming this two-tiered, age-variable approach to regulating 
obscene content, the Supreme Court first emphasized the right of 
parents to direct the rearing of their children as “basic in the 
 
 29. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
 30. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
 31. See infra text accompanying notes 37–40. 
 32. This principle was not commonsensical to the plaintiff in that case, who advanced 
“the broad proposition that the scope of the constitutional freedom of expression secured to a 
citizen to read or see material concerned with sex cannot be made to depend upon whether the 
citizen is an adult or a minor.” Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 636. 
 33. Id. at 636–37. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 646 app. a. 
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structure of our society.”36 The Court observed that “parents and 
others, teachers for example, who have this primary responsibility for 
children’s well-being are entitled to the support of laws designed to 
aid discharge of that responsibility.”37 Finding that the prohibitions 
in the New York statute aided parents (and those standing in loco 
parentis) in discharging these responsibilities, the Court upheld the 
statute.38 The Court also emphasized the fact that the statute’s 
operation did not usurp parental autonomy to determine what 
material was suitable for their children: “the [statute’s] prohibition 
against sale to minors does not bar parents who so desire from 
purchasing the magazines for their children.”39 While the statute’s 
prohibition on the dissemination of obscene-for-minors speech 
might therefore be thought to aid parents in the discharge of their 
parental duties, a statute that went so far as to remove from parents 
the authority to determine what material was suitable for their 
children would be found to unconstitutionally restrict this aspect of 
parental autonomy.40 
The Ginsberg Court also recognized that, in addition to parents’ 
interest in regulating their children’s access to harmful speech, the 
State enjoyed an “independent interest in the well-being of its 
youth” that provided a separate justification for regulating minors’ 
access to harmful speech. The Court observed that: 
While the supervision of children’s reading may best be left to their 
parents, the knowledge that parental control or guidance cannot 
always be provided and society’s transcendent interest in protecting 
the welfare of children justify reasonable regulation of the sale of 
material to them. It is, therefore, altogether fitting and proper for a 
state to include in a statute designed to regulate the sale of 
pornography to children special standards, broader than those 
embodied in the legislation aimed at controlling dissemination of 
such material to adults.41 
In short, the Ginsberg Court held that the government can 
regulate minors’ access to speech under a different standard than that 
 
 36. Id. at 639. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See text accompanying note 59. 
 41. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 640 (quoting People v. Kahan, 206 N.E.2d 333, 334 (N.Y. 
1965) (Fuld, J., concurring)). 
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by which adult access to speech is regulated, so long as certain 
safeguards are included within such regulation. Such safeguards 
primarily include those definitional safeguards set forth in Miller and 
tailored to minors, including a patently offensive and prurient 
interest analysis undertaken in light of contemporary community 
standards and a savings clause for speech with redeeming social 
importance for minors. The constitutional requirement of including 
a savings clause in this context makes clear that any such regulation 
must preserve minors’ access to expression that has serious literary, 
artistic, scientific, or political value for minors. Such safeguards also 
require that those disseminating sexually-themed speech will be able 
to determine the age of prospective recipients of such speech, and 
that adults’ right to access non-obscene speech (as well as their right 
to consent to their child’s access to such speech) not be abridged. 
III. CONGRESSIONAL EFFORTS TO REGULATE MINORS’ ACCESS TO 
SEXUALLY-THEMED CONTENT ON THE INTERNET 
Over the past decade, Congress has undertaken three major 
efforts to regulate minors’ access to sexually-themed Internet speech: 
the CDA,42 COPA,43 and CIPA.44 While the Supreme Court upheld 
CIPA’s mechanism of encouraging schools and libraries to use 
software filters to restrict minors’ access to such content, it has struck 
down and identified serious constitutional infirmities with the CDA 
and COPA. While the Supreme Court in each case found that the 
statutes satisfied the first prong of the two-pronged strict scrutiny 
analysis—by advancing the compelling government interest of 
protecting minors from harmful sexually-themed speech—the Court 
held that Congress failed to advance this interest using the least 
speech-restrictive means possible. 
A. The Communications Decency Act of 1996 
Congress’s first attempt to regulate minors’ access to harmful 
Internet speech was enacted as part of the CDA. Reacting to reports 
that a substantial percentage of the content available on the Internet 
 
 42. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2000). 
 43. Id. § 231. 
 44. See id. § 254. Because it raises separate issues and has developed within a distinct 
line of First Amendment jurisprudence, I leave to others a discussion of Congress’s efforts to 
restrict access to child pornography on the Internet. See, e.g., Symposium, supra note 14. 
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contained hard-core pornography, Congress sought to criminalize 
the transmission and display of indecent materials that were available 
to minors.45 The constitutionality of such regulation was complicated 
by a number of factors. First, as a content-based restriction of 
speech, the regulation would be deemed presumptively 
unconstitutional and subject to exacting scrutiny.46 Second, given 
the state of technology, such regulation inevitably restricted adults’ 
constitutional right to access non-obscene sexually-themed 
expression. Third, even to the extent that it restricted minors’ access 
to indecent speech, the legislation failed adequately to protect 
minors’ right to access sexually-themed expression that was not 
obscene for minors. 
With Ginsberg and Miller as its guides, Congress in 1996 could 
have and should have carefully crafted a regulation of minors’ access 
to sexually-themed content on the Internet, while at the same time 
preserving adults’ right to access content that was protected for 
adults. Because Congress was not careful in drafting the CDA, the 
Supreme Court struck down the statute.47 The CDA’s efforts to 
regulate minors’ access to harmful Internet content were set forth in 
two provisions. First, the CDA criminalized the knowing 
transmission of “obscene or indecent” communications to any 
recipient less than eighteen years of age.48 Second, the CDA 
 
 45. See, e.g., Dorothy Imrich Mullin, The First Amendment and the Web: The Internet 
Porn Panic and Restricting Indecency in Cyberspace, http://www.library.ucsb.edu/untangle/ 
mullin.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2008). 
 46. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (holding that 
the government cannot restrict speech on account of its content, “subject only to narrow and 
well-understood exceptions”). 
 47. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997). 
 48. Id. 
Whoever— 
(1) in interstate or foreign communications— 
. . . 
(B) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly— 
(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and 
(ii) initiates the transmission of, any comment, request, suggestion, 
proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene or 
indecent, knowing that the recipient of the communication is under 
18 years of age, regardless of whether the maker of such 
communication placed the call or initiated the communication; 
. . . 
shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned not more than two 
years, or both. 
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criminalized the knowing sending or display to any person under 
eighteen any communication “that, in context, depicts or describes, 
in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community 
standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs.”49 The Act 
provided certain affirmative defenses to these two criminal 
prohibitions, including defenses for those who undertook “good 
faith, . . . effective . . . actions” to restrict access by minors to the 
prohibited communications and those who restricted such access by 
requiring certain designated forms of age proof, such as a verified 
credit card or an adult identification number.50 
The Supreme Court identified several constitutional infirmities in 
the CDA’s definitions. First, Congress failed to align the CDA’s 
statutory definitions of unprotected speech with the constitutional 
definitions of obscene and obscene-for-minors speech that the 
Supreme Court painstakingly set forth in Miller and Ginsberg, 
rendering the statute’s definitions of unprotected speech vague and 
overbroad.51 Beyond the problems of vagueness and imprecision in 
the CDA’s definitions, Congress also failed adequately to protect 
adults’ constitutional right to access Internet expression that was 
unprotected for minors but nonetheless protected for adults.52 
Because of the formidable technological difficulties in ensuring that 
 
47 U.S.C. § 223(a). 
 49. Reno, 521 U.S. at 860 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 223(d)). 
Whoever— 
(1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly— 
(A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific person or 
persons under 18 years of age, or 
(B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a manner available 
to a person under 18 years of age, any comment, request, suggestion, 
proposal, image, or other communication that, in context, depicts or 
describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary 
community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs, regardless 
of whether the user of such service placed the call or initiated the 
communication; or 
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under such person’s 
control to be used for an activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent 
that it be used for such activity, 
shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned not more than two 
years, or both. 
47 U.S.C. § 223(d). 
 50. Reno, 521 U.S. at 860–61 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(5)). 
 51. Id. at 874. 
 52. Id. at 875–76. 
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Internet communications that are unprotected for minors are 
communicated only to adults, the CDA’s provisions essentially 
operated to restrict adults from engaging in and accessing expression 
that is constitutionally protected for adults.53 
In defending the constitutionality of the CDA, the Government 
contended that the Act’s prohibitions, combined with its affirmative 
defenses based on the use of age-verification technology, did nothing 
more than zone the Internet into adult zones and minor zones. 
Because adults were allowed to disseminate adult content to 
recipients who could prove by use of age-verification technology that 
they were adults, the Government asserted that neither adult 
senders’ nor adult recipients’ constitutional rights were burdened.54 
The Court disagreed.55 First, it upheld the district court’s finding 
that there were no reliable means of age verification currently 
available.56 Although content providers of adult material could 
condition access on receipt of a verified credit card, the Court found 
that credit card verification was effectively unavailable to a substantial 
number of non-commercial Internet content providers. It found 
further that “using credit card processing as a surrogate for proof of 
age would impose costs on noncommercial Web sites that would 
require many of them to shut down,” and furthermore, that reliance 
on credit cards as proof of age would impose burdens on adults who 
do not have credit cards who wish to access such content.57 Because 
the CDA’s provisions restricted adults’ access to speech that was 
constitutionally protected for them, the CDA “suppresse[d] a large 
amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive 
and to address to one another.”58 
Furthermore, the CDA failed to protect parents’ autonomy to 
determine what material their children should be able to access. In 
contrast to the statute upheld in Ginsberg, which permitted parents 
to override the state’s determination of obscenity for minors and to 
purchase “girlie” magazines for their children, the CDA effected a 
 
 53. Id. at 876–77. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 868. 
 56. Id. at 856. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 874. 
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complete ban on minors’ access to statutorily-proscribed materials 
and usurped parental autonomy in this regard.59 
In assessing the CDA’s constitutionality under strict scrutiny, the 
Supreme Court explained that if there were effective means available 
to restrict minors’ access to harmful material while imposing few or 
no restrictions on adults’ free speech rights, the CDA would fail the 
“least restrictive means” component of this analysis.60 In assessing 
this component, the Court found that other, less restrictive means of 
restricting minors’ access to sexually-themed Internet content were 
or would soon be available. Specifically, the Court noted that 
“currently available user-based software suggests that a reasonably 
effective method by which parents can prevent their children from 
accessing material which the parents believe is inappropriate will 
soon be widely available.”61 Because user-based filtering software62 
presented a means of restricting minors’ access to harmful material 
that would intrude less severely upon adults’ right to access 
protected material—and upon adults’ parental autonomy to 
determine which material to allow their children to access—the 
Supreme Court concluded that the CDA did not embody the least 
restrictive means of advancing Congress’s compelling goal of 
protecting minors from harmful sexually-themed Internet expression. 
Thus, in part because of the potential availability of a better 
technological solution to the problem of restricting minors’ access to 
sexually-themed expression (in the form of user-based filtering 
software), the Court rejected the solution offered by Congress in the 
CDA. 
Justice O’Connor, concurring in part and dissenting in part, 
interpreted the CDA as a partially successful attempt by Congress to 
zone the Internet into adult zones and minor zones via the use of 
age-verification technology.63 Finding that “the undeniable purpose 
of the CDA is to segregate indecent material on the Internet into 
certain areas that minors cannot access,”64 she explained that 
analogous zoning laws—at least as applied to real space—have been 
upheld by the Court. Justice O’Connor’s analysis leads to the 
 
 59. Id. at 865. 
 60. Id. at 874. 
 61. Id. at 877 (citing ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 842 (1997)). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 886 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 64. Id. 
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question of what type of zoning laws in cyberspace can withstand 
constitutional scrutiny. First, as Justice O’Connor explained, a 
constitutional zoning law must not unduly restrict adults’ access to 
constitutionally protected material; and second, the content banned 
for minors must be content that minors have no constitutional right 
to access.65 That is, in order for a cyberzoning statute to comply with 
the First Amendment, adults must have ready access to the adult 
zone, which contains—and does not restrict or chill—content that is 
constitutional for adults; and, minors must have access to the 
minors’ zone, which contains all content that minors have a 
constitutional right to access. Zoning or content regulations that 
restrict or burden adults’ access to the adult zone, or limit the 
content within the adult zone to that which minors have a 
constitutional right to access, will be found unconstitutional. For 
example, the Court found in Butler v. Michigan that a criminal 
statute prohibiting the sale, to minors and to adults, of materials 
“tending to the corruption of the morals of youth” was 
unconstitutional because it collapsed the minors’ zone and the adult 
zone.66 In contrast, in Ginsberg v. New York, the sale of “girlie” 
magazines was prohibited only as to minors; the statute preserved 
adults’ constitutional right to access the adult zone by allowing them 
to purchase such non-obscene, sexually-themed content.67 
Accordingly, in order for a statute to constitutionally create adult 
zones and minor zones on the Internet, it needs to: (1) preserve 
adults’ unburdened access to the full panoply of content that adults 
have a right to access; (2) grant minors access to the range of 
content that they have a constitutional right to access; and (3) 
incorporate a method of distinguishing between adult and minor 
Internet users that does not impose a burden on adults seeking to 
disseminate or to access protected-for-adults content. Although 
Justice O’Connor explained that legislation that created such adult 
and minor zones on the Internet in the above manner would be 
constitutional, she concluded that the CDA did not meet this 
constitutional requirement.68 
 
 65. Id. at 888. 
 66. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383–84 (1957). 
 67. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636 (1968). 
 68. Reno, 521 U.S. at 896–97 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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B. The Child Online Protection Act of 1998—Round One 
Shortly after the Supreme Court struck down the relevant 
provisions of the CDA, Congress went back to the drawing board, 
this time directing its attention to the applicable Supreme Court 
obscenity (and obscenity-for-minors) jurisprudence. Legislators 
focused in particular on Miller’s three-pronged test, as modified for 
minors by Ginsberg, and put forward a more serious effort at 
constitutionally regulating minors’ access to harmful Internet speech. 
In COPA, Congress carefully imported the three prongs of the 
Miller test into its regulation, while also incorporating an age-
dependent standard for determining harmful material, as sanctioned 
by Ginsberg.69 And, like the CDA, COPA also provides an affirmative 
defense for those who in good faith restrict minors’ access to 
material that is harmful to minors, by use of credit cards, adult codes, 
and other “reasonable measures that are feasible under available 
technology.”70 If one compares the requisite constitutional definition 
of obscenity set forth in Miller, and modified in Ginsberg, with the 
definition of “harmful to minors” set forth in COPA, one might 
predict that the statute would readily withstand constitutional 
scrutiny. As discussed below, in reviewing the constitutionality of 
 
 69. 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6) (2000). The relevant provisions of COPA are as follows: 
(a)(1) Prohibited conduct— 
Whoever knowingly and with knowledge of the character of the material, in 
interstate or foreign commerce by means of the World Wide Web, makes any 
communication for commercial purposes that is available to any minor and that 
includes any material that is harmful to minors shall be fined not more than 
$50,000, imprisoned not more than 6 months, or both. 
. . . .  
(e)(6) Material that is harmful to minors— 
The term “material that is harmful to minors” means any communication, 
picture, image, graphic image file, article, recording, writing, or other matter 
of any kind that is obscene or that— 
(A) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, 
would find, taking the material as a whole and with respect to minors, is 
designed to appeal to, or is designed to pander to, the prurient interest; 
B) depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently offensive with 
respect to minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an 
actual or simulated normal or perverted sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of 
the genitals or post-pubescent female breast; and 
(C) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific 
value for minors. 
47 U.S.C. § 231 (emphasis added). 
 70. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 570 (2002). 
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COPA, however, the courts have found substantial constitutional 
flaws in other aspects of the statute’s definition and application to 
Internet content. At each level of review, courts have found different 
aspects of COPA to be constitutionally infirm. The Supreme Court 
has ruled twice on the constitutionality of COPA, and it will likely 
grant certiorari soon to make a final determination of the statute’s 
constitutionality.71 The district court, in reviewing COPA and in 
response to the ACLU’s motion to preliminarily enjoin the statute, 
emphasized the burdens that the statute imposed on speakers and 
publishers of sexually-themed, protected-for-adults expression. The 
court found that these burdens were substantial enough to render 
the statute unconstitutional.72 The court further held that, as with 
the CDA, Congress failed to establish that COPA embodied the least 
restrictive means of regulating minors’ access to harmful-to-minors 
material, because “blocking or filtering technology may be at least as 
successful as COPA would be in restricting minors’ access to harmful 
material online without imposing the burden on constitutionally 
protected speech that COPA imposes on adult users or Web site 
operators.”73 Accordingly, in its initial assessment of COPA’s 
constitutionality, the district court concluded that COPA failed to 
withstand constitutional scrutiny because user-based filtering 
software was less speech-restrictive, yet equally effective means of 
achieving a compelling government interest. 
On appeal, the Third Circuit emphasized a different aspect of the 
Supreme Court’s obscenity jurisprudence—one that goes to the 
heart of regulating obscene and obscene-for-minors content on the 
Internet, viz., the autonomy of local communities to determine the 
contours of obscene (and obscene-for-minors) speech within their 
communities.74 As discussed above, Miller’s first prong requires that 
there be an inquiry into whether the average member of a 
community, applying that community’s contemporary standards, 
would find that the work appeals to the prurient interest.75 Miller’s 
second prong (implicitly) carries over this communitarian inquiry to 
the assessment of whether the expression is patently offensive.76 
 
 71. See infra Part III.D. 
 72. ACLU v. Reno (COPA I), 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 495–97 (E.D. Pa. 1999). 
 73. Id. at 497. 
 74. See ACLU v. Reno (COPA II), 217 F.3d 162, 173–74 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 75. See text accompanying notes 21–23. 
 76. See text accompanying notes 24–26. 
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These required communitarian analyses would permit a jury in a 
community such as Salt Lake City to classify certain content as 
obscene and unprotected within its local community, where such 
speech might very well be deemed protected by another local 
community, such as New York City.77 While this constitutionally-
required, geographically-based determination of obscenity can 
operate to separate protected from unprotected expression in real 
space, this geographic variability becomes problematic when applied 
to expression on the Internet. Given the meaningful geographic 
boundaries in real space, it is feasible for Salt Lake City to effectively 
exclude expression contained in books, magazines, or videos that it 
considers obscene according to its local community standards. 
Likewise, it is feasible, even if somewhat burdensome for distributors 
of sexually-themed expression contained in books, magazines, 
videos, mailings, etc., to take steps to restrict the dissemination of 
such works into communities that consider such works to be 
obscene, in order to avoid being prosecuted for purveying obscenity 
within less “tolerant” communities. And, by exercising its right 
under Miller to determine the contours of obscenity within its local 
community, Salt Lake City does not necessarily restrict the ability of 
other communities to determine for themselves the contours of 
obscenity within their communities. 
Given the absence of meaningful boundaries delimiting one local 
community from another within cyberspace, however, it becomes far 
more difficult for individual communities to determine the contours 
of obscenity within their borders without substantial spillover to 
other communities. Because it is not feasible for an Internet 
publisher of sexually-themed expression to restrict the dissemination 
of its expression only to those local communities that would likely 
not find such expression to be obscene, Internet publishers have only 
one realistic alternative to avoid being subject to obscenity 
prosecution—forgo dissemination of such expression on the Internet 
altogether.78 Given the practical inability of Web publishers to 
 
 77. These communitarian analyses are subject to the judicially-determined floor 
described above. See text accompanying notes 27–28. 
 78. For example, it might come to pass that a Salt Lake City jury would find that a 
particular Web site was obscene for minors under a Miller/Ginsberg definition of obscenity, 
such as set forth in COPA. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996). If 
so, the only meaningful option for the Internet publisher of such material would be to take 
down such expression altogether for all communities throughout the United States (and 
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restrict the dissemination of expression by geographical location, one 
community’s determination of obscenity spills over to all other 
communities, thereby impinging upon these other communities’ 
autonomy to determine the contours of obscene and obscene-for-
minors expression for themselves. 
Addressing this issue, the Third Circuit held that the conflict 
between (1) the prerogative of a community to determine the 
boundary between obscene-for-minors speech and non-obscene-for-
minors speech and (2) the inability to control the geographic 
dissemination of Internet content, was so severe as to render 
COPA’s reliance on contemporary community standards 
constitutionally intolerable.79 Accordingly, the Third Circuit struck 
down COPA as unconstitutional on these grounds alone.80 
Writing for a plurality of the Supreme Court, Justice Thomas 
rejected the Third Circuit’s conclusion that the conflict between 
Miller’s requirement of community-determined standards of 
obscenity and the inability to limit dissemination geographically on 
the Internet rendered COPA unconstitutional on its face.81 Justice 
Thomas explained that the Supreme Court historically has subjected 
speakers and publishers disseminating their content to nationwide 
audiences to potentially varying community standards of obscenity, 
and that “requiring a speaker disseminating material to a national 
audience to observe varying community standards does not violate 
the First Amendment.”82 Those mailing materials to a nationwide 
audience,83 as well as those operating commercial dial-a-porn 
operator services,84 for example, have been subject to potentially 
varying local community standards under the Supreme Court’s 
obscenity jurisprudence. Referring to these earlier obscenity cases, 
Justice Thomas observed: 
 
indeed the world), even though some other communities, applying their contemporary 
community standards, would conclude that such expression was protected by the First 
Amendment and that members of their community had a First Amendment right to access 
such material. 
 79. COPA II, 217 F.3d 162, 173–76 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 580 (2002). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 581. 
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There is no constitutional barrier under Miller to prohibiting 
communications that are obscene in some communities under local 
standards even though they are not obscene in others. [For 
example, if dial-a-porn operator] Sable’s audience is comprised of 
different communities with different local standards, Sable 
ultimately bears the burden of complying with the prohibition on 
obscene messages.85 
The Third Circuit had held that these earlier obscenity cases 
involving different mediums of expression were distinguishable from 
COPA because the defendants in the earlier cases could control the 
geographic distribution of their material, whereas Internet publishers 
have no comparable control.86 Justice Thomas rejected this 
distinction, explaining that in none of these earlier cases was “the 
speaker’s ability to target the release of material into particular 
geographic areas integral to the legal analysis.”87 
Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, who concurred in the 
judgment, disagreed. They found that the Court of Appeals’ 
emphasis on COPA’s incorporation of varying community standards 
was not misplaced, and they expressed concern about the conflict 
between geographical variability in the definition of obscene-for-
minors speech and the inability of Internet publishers and speakers to 
control the geographic dissemination of their speech.88 These 
Justices emphasized that Miller’s contemporary community 
standards test grants individual communities the autonomy to 
determine what speech is and is not protected within their borders 
and observed that “variation in community standards constitutes a 
particular burden on Internet speech.”89 
Yet, because the case involved a facial challenge to COPA—
before it had been applied to restrict any speech whatsoever—the 
concurring Justices ultimately concluded that those challenging the 
statute at this stage had failed to meet their burden of identifying 
what, if any, speech would be unconstitutionally burdened by the 
statute.90 Although they observed that the national variation in 
 
 85. Id. (quoting Sable Commc’n of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 125–26 (1989)) 
(emphasis omitted). 
 86. Id. at 573. 
 87. Id. at 582. 
 88. Id. at 597 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 602. 
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community standards constituted a particular burden on Internet 
speech, the concurring Justices found the Third Circuit’s conclusion 
to be premature absent a comprehensive and careful analysis of the 
burdened speech.91 
On remand, the lower courts were charged with expanding the 
focus of their inquiry into the constitutionality of COPA beyond the 
effect of the national variation in community standards on sexually-
themed Internet expression.92 
C. The Children’s Internet Protection Act of 2000 
In the meantime, faced with the hostile judicial reception to the 
zoning schemes embodied in the CDA and COPA, Congress 
undertook a software filtering-based approach in CIPA. Enacted in 
2000, CIPA operates by conditioning public schools’ and libraries’ 
eligibility to receive certain federal funds upon their implementation 
of filtering software to block access to harmful sexual expression on 
the Internet.93 Within the regulatory scheme contemplated by CIPA, 
each community, acting through its community-based institutions, 
theoretically enjoys a measure of autonomy to determine for its own 
community the contours of obscene and obscene-for-minors 
expression. This determination is to be effectuated through the use 
of filtering software configured to block expression that falls within 
the definitions of speech that is harmful to minors set forth by the 
community-based institution itself (i.e., the public school or library). 
As such, CIPA’s regulatory scheme enables communities to impose 
their “contemporary community standards” with respect to obscene 
content harmful to minors, in a way that potentially overcomes the 
constitutional obstacles94 that the courts identified in COPA. 
Under the CIPA scheme, each public elementary and secondary 
school and each public library theoretically enjoys the autonomy to 
determine what type of Internet speech is obscene and what type of 
Internet speech is obscene for minors. As a theoretical matter, under 
CIPA, each community, acting through its public schools and 
libraries, is permitted to specify the parameters of protected and 
unprotected speech, for minors and for adults, and to implement 
 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 586 (plurality opinion). 
 93. See generally 47 U.S.C. § 254(h) (2000). 
 94. See supra Part III.B. 
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these parameters by configuring filtering software—to be used by 
members of its community only within the community’s public 
libraries and schools—to effectuate these restrictions. Thus, CIPA’s 
scheme quite nicely resolves the seemingly intractable problems to 
implementing a Miller-based constitutional regulation of minors’ 
access to obscene speech by allowing each community to determine 
the contours of protected and unprotected speech for its community, 
thereby protecting community autonomy and substantially limiting 
community-to-community spillover of such determinations. As 
discussed below, however, despite the fact that CIPA’s basic 
regulatory scheme embodies great promise for achieving a 
constitutional regulation of minors’ access to harmful speech, the 
details of this scheme have proven problematic. 
CIPA conditions public schools’ and libraries’ receipt of certain 
federal subsidies on their use of software filters. In order to receive 
grants under the Library Services and Technology Act (LSTA) or 
“E-rate” discounts for Internet access and support under the 
Telecommunications Act, public libraries and schools are required to 
certify that they are using “technology protection measures” that 
prevent patrons from accessing visual depictions that are “obscene,” 
“child pornography,” or in the case of minors, “harmful to 
minors.”95 While CIPA’s scheme allows library officials under certain 
circumstances to disable software filters for certain patrons engaged 
in bona fide research or other lawful purposes, the disabling of such 
filters on computers used by minors is prohibited if the library or 
school receives E-rate discounts.96 
CIPA modifies the federal E-rate program, under which 
telecommunications carriers are required to provide high-speed 
Internet access and related services to public schools and libraries at 
discount rates. CIPA also requires that a library “having one or more 
computers with Internet access may not receive services at discount 
rates” unless the library certifies that it is 
enforcing a policy of Internet safety for minors that includes 
monitoring the online activities of minors and the operation of a 
technology protection measure with respect to any of its computers 
 
 95. 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(5)(B) (2000). 
 96. 20 U.S.C.A. § 6777(c) (2002); 20 U.S.C.A. § 9134(f)(3) (2003). The disabling 
provision in the context of E-rate discounts applies only “during use by an adult.” 47 U.S.C. § 
254(h)(5)(D) (2000). 
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with Internet access that protects against access through such 
computers to visual depictions that are— (I) obscene; (II) child 
pornography; or (III) harmful to minors; and (ii) . . . enforcing the 
operation of such technology protection measure during any use of 
such computers by minors.97 
Thus, libraries and schools, in order to receive E-rate discounts, 
must certify that, during any use of Internet-accessible computers by 
minors (i.e., those sixteen years of age and under98), filtering 
technology is being used to block access to obscene material, child 
pornography, and material that is “harmful to minors.”99 While the 
terms “obscene”100 and “child pornography”101 are given their 
(constitutionally acceptable) standard meanings, CIPA defines 
material that is “harmful to minors” as 
[A]ny picture, image, graphic image file, or other visual depiction 
that— 
(i) taken as a whole and with respect to minors, appeals to a 
prurient interest in nudity, sex, or excretion; 
(ii) depicts, describes, or represents, in a patently offensive way 
with respect to what is suitable for minors, an actual or 
simulated sexual act or sexual contact, actual or simulated 
normal or perverted sexual acts, or a lewd exhibition of the 
genitals; and 
(iii) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value as to minors.102 
Although the third prong of the harmful-to-minors definition by 
its terms provides a savings clause for material that appellate courts 
determine possesses redeeming social value, CIPA appears to 
prohibit federal interference in local determinations regarding what 
Internet content is appropriate for minors: 
A determination regarding what matter is inappropriate for minors 
shall be made by the school board, local educational agency, 
library, or other authority responsible for making the 
 
 97. 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(5)(D) (2000). 
 98. Id. § 254(h)(7)(D). 
 99. Id. § 254(h)(7)(G). 
 100. Id. § 254(h)(7)(E). 
 101. Id. § 254(h)(7)(F). 
 102. Id. § 254(h)(7)(G). 
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determination. No agency or instrumentality of the United States 
Government may— 
(A) establish criteria for making such determination; 
(B) review the determination made by the certifying 
[entity] . . . ; or 
(C) consider the criteria employed by the certifying [entity] . . . 
in the administration of [CIPA’s requirements].103 
Additionally, as a further condition on its receipt of E-rate 
discounts, a library or school must certify that, during any use of 
Internet-accessible computers—by minors or by adults, including 
staff members—it is “enforcing a policy of Internet safety that 
includes the operation of a technology protection measure with 
respect to any of its computers with Internet access that protects 
against access through such computers to visual depictions that are— 
(I) obscene; or (II) child pornography . . . .”104 Thus, a library or 
school, in order to receive E-rate discounts, must further certify that 
it is using filtering technology to block access to obscene and child 
pornographic materials during any use of computers with internet 
access. 
With respect to adult use of Internet-accessible computers, CIPA 
provides that a library official is permitted to “disable the technology 
protection measure concerned, during use by an adult, to enable 
access for bona fide research or other lawful purpose.”105 
Importantly, however, CIPA’s amendments to the E-rate program 
do not permit libraries or schools to disable filters to enable bona 
fide research or other lawful use for minors.106 
In sum, CIPA requires that public libraries and schools, as a 
condition of receiving federal funding under the E-rate program, (1) 
utilize filtering software to block adults’ access to obscene and child 
pornographic visual content, and (2) utilize filtering software to 
block minors’ Internet access to the above content as well as to visual 
content that is harmful to minors. Although the filtering of adults’ 
Internet access may be disabled for bona fide research or other lawful 
purposes, such disabling is not permitted for minors. 
 
 103. Id. § 254(l)(2). 
 104. Id. § 254(h)(5)(C)(i). 
 105. Id. § 254(h)(5)(D). 
 106. Id. 
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CIPA’s modifications to the LSTA program generally track its 
modifications to the E-rate program. CIPA amends the LSTA to 
require that the funds made available under the Act will not be 
available unless the library has in place and is enforcing “a policy of 
Internet safety for minors that includes the operation of a technology 
protection measure with respect to any of its computers with 
Internet access” that protects against access through such computers 
of certain types of content.107 When such computers are “in use by 
minors,” the library must protect against access to visual depictions 
that are considered to be “obscene,” “child pornography,” or are 
“harmful to minors.”108 During any use of its computers, the library 
must use filtering software to protect against access to visual 
depictions that are “obscene” or “child pornography” in order to 
receive such funds.109 In addition, the definition of the term 
“harmful to minors” in CIPA’s amendment to the LSTA program is 
similar to the definition found in the amendment to the E-rate 
program.110 CIPA’s amendment to the LSTA, like its amendment of 
the E-rate program, allows for library officials to disable filtering in 
order to “enable access for a bona fide research or other lawful 
purposes.”111 But the E-rate disabling provisions do not permit the 
disabling of filters during use by minors.112 
CIPA’s definition of material that is harmful to minors embodies 
the constitutionally necessary elements set forth by the Supreme 
Court in Miller. And, by enabling local community-based 
institutions to decide for their communities what material is harmful 
to minors within their communities, CIPA advances Miller’s goal of 
granting local communities the autonomy to determine the scope of 
protected and unprotected speech within their communities, thus 
resolving the problem of community-to-community spillover 
identified by the Third Circuit in its initial consideration of the 
COPA case. 
 
 107. 20 U.S.C.A. § 9134(f)(1)(A)(i) (2003). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. § 9134(f)(1)(B). 
 110. Compare 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(7)(G) (2000), with 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(7)(B) 
(2000). 
 111. 20 U.S.C.A. § 9134(f)(3) (2003). 
 112. Id. 
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In order to understand the constitutional issues at stake in CIPA, 
it is important to understand the mechanics of software filtering.113 
Filtering software programs operate by blocking Internet users’ 
access to certain Web sites as follows: 
When a person types in [an Internet address or Uniform Resource 
Locator (URL)] indicating material they wish to read, the [filtering 
software] examines various parts of the URL against its internal 
blacklist to see if the URL is forbidden. 
. . . . 
If the [URL] is found on the blacklist . . . then the program looks 
to see how extensively it should be banned [i.e., whether to 
blacklist the whole domain, a directory of the site, or only a 
particular file on the site]. 
. . . . 
Blacklists can have multiple categories of banned sites (e.g. one for 
“Sex,” another for “Drugs,” perhaps another for “Rock & Roll,” 
and so on) , . . . But blacklists are almost always secret, so there’s 
no way to know what sites are actually in the category. 
. . . . 
The whole list-matching process above may be repeated all over 
again against exception lists or “whitelists.” A few products consist 
only of whitelists, or can work in whitelist-only mode. [Some 
filtering software] can be set . . . so that everything not prohibited 
is permitted (blacklist-only), or only that which is explicitly allowed 
is permitted (whitelist-only). And of course the whitelist can 
override the blacklist. In general, such blacklist/whitelist settings 
are standard in server-level programs, along with the ability to 
create additional organization-specific blacklists or whitelists.114 
 
 113. My discussion of software filtering follows closely that provided by filtering experts 
Seth Finkelstein and Lee Tien in their extremely lucid article Blacklisting Bytes, Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, Mar. 6, 2001, http://w2.eff.org/Censorship/Censorware/ 
20010306_eff_nrc_paper1.html; see also R. Polk Wagner, Filters and the First Amendment, 83 
MINN. L. REV. 755 (1999) (describing the essential features of software filters). 
 114. Finkelstein & Tien, supra note 113. 
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The default blacklists and whitelists used by filtering software 
programs are created by the software developers and constitute a 
substantial portion of the programs’ value to consumers. As such, 
these lists are typically protected as trade secrets.115 Thus, a library 
implementing a filtering software program typically has no way of 
knowing which Web sites will actually be rendered inaccessible by 
the filtering software program. Although the library may choose to 
configure the filtering software to filter out certain pre-defined 
categories of Web sites (such as “Adult/Sexually Explicit”116), it has 
no way of knowing the criteria used by the software developers to 
select which Web sites fall into this category, nor which Web sites 
will actually fall within this category. 
The constitutionality of CIPA was initially considered by a 
special three-judge panel, which found first that the filtering software 
programs mandated by CIPA “erroneously block a huge amount of 
speech that is protected by the First Amendment.”117 The panel held 
further that software filtering programs inevitably over-block 
harmless Internet content, which adults and minors have a First 
Amendment right to access, and under-block obscene and child 
pornographic content, which neither adults nor minors have a First 
Amendment right to access.118 This is partly because the categories 
used by such software for filtering purposes are broader than the 
constitutional categories of unprotected speech defined by CIPA and 
in part because of the imperfections in filtering software 
technology.119 Accordingly, the panel concluded that “[g]iven the 
substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech blocked by 
[filtering software],” CIPA was not narrowly tailored.120 
The Supreme Court reversed this decision, holding that the 
restrictions CIPA imposed on speech (or more precisely, the 
restrictions that CIPA required libraries to impose on speech) were 
not unconstitutional.121 The Justices, finding the statute 
constitutional on its face, articulated several rationales for their 
 
 115. See, e.g., Am. Library Ass’n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 429–30 (E.D. 
Pa. 2002), rev’d on other grounds, 539 U.S. 194 (2003). 
 116. Id. at 428. 
 117. Id. at 448. 
 118. Id. at 475–79. 
 119. Id. at 476–77. 
 120. Id. at 476. 
 121. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 199 (2003). 
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conclusion. Chief Justice Rehnquist, who authored a plurality 
opinion in which Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas joined, 
held that strict scrutiny was the wrong standard to apply. Chief 
Justice Rehnquist explained that because providing Internet access 
was not tantamount to creating a public forum, strict scrutiny was 
not the proper level of scrutiny for analyzing CIPA’s 
constitutionality.122 Because CIPA—unlike the CDA and COPA—
did not involve direct government regulation of Internet speech but 
rather the regulation of Internet speech within a governmental 
forum for speech, the Court turned to the public forum doctrine to 
determine what level of scrutiny to apply.123 Under the public forum 
doctrine, the level of scrutiny applicable to government regulation of 
speech depends upon the characteristics of the forum in which the 
speech is being regulated.124 If the governmental forum for speech at 
issue is a “traditional public forum” or a “designated public forum,” 
then strict scrutiny applies to any regulation of speech within that 
forum.125 On the other hand, if the forum is a non-public forum, 
then reduced scrutiny applies to speech regulations within such 
forum.126 
Chief Justice Rehnquist first explained that Internet access in 
public libraries did not constitute a “traditional public forum” within 
the constitutional meaning of that term because “this resource—
which did not exist until quite recently—has not ‘immemorially been 
held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, . . . 
been used for purposes of assembly, communication of thoughts 
between citizens, and discussing public questions.’”127 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist next explained that Internet access in public libraries did 
not constitute a “designated public forum.” In order to create a 
designated public forum, “the government must make an affirmative 
 
 122. Id. at 205–06. On this point, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that “we require the 
Government to employ the least restrictive means only when the forum is a public one and 
strict scrutiny applies.” Id. at 207 n.3. 
 123. Id. at 204–07. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 205–06. 
 126. Id. at 206–07. 
 127. Id. at 205 (quoting Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 
672, 679 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Of course, given Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s formulation of the test for traditional public forums, it will be impossible for any 
resource in a modern medium to fall within this definition. 
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choice to open up its property for use as a public forum.”128 
According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, “[a] public library does not 
acquire Internet terminals in order to create a public forum for Web 
publishers to express themselves, [but rather] . . . to facilitate 
research, learning, and recreational pursuits by furnishing materials 
of requisite and appropriate quality.”129 Chief Justice Rehnquist 
continued that “[e]ven if appellees had proffered more persuasive 
evidence that public libraries intended to create a forum for speech 
by connecting to the Internet, we would hesitate to import the 
‘public forum doctrine . . . wholesale into’ the context of the 
Internet.”130 
Having concluded that libraries’ provision of Internet access did 
not constitute a public forum, Chief Justice Rehnquist analyzed 
CIPA’s constitutionality within a reduced-scrutiny framework, 
inquiring whether libraries’ use of filtering software as mandated by 
CIPA was “reasonable.”131 
Chief Justice Rehnquist considered but rejected the argument 
that the “overblocking” inherent in filtering software rendered the 
statute unconstitutional.132 In reaching this conclusion, he relied 
upon representations of the Solicitor General at oral argument that 
libraries would allow any adult patron to have erroneously blocked 
sites unblocked and/or software filters disabled upon request: 
Assuming that such erroneous blocking presents constitutional 
difficulties, any such concerns are dispelled by the ease with which 
patrons may have the filtering software disabled. When a patron 
encounters a blocked site, he need only ask a librarian to unblock it 
or (at least in the case of adults) disable the filter. As the District 
Court found, libraries have the capacity to permanently unblock 
any erroneously blocked site, and the Solicitor General stated at 
oral argument that a “library may . . . eliminate the filtering with 
respect to specific sites . . . at the request of a patron.” With respect 
to adults, CIPA also expressly authorizes library officials to 
 
 128. Id. at 206. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 207 n.3 (quoting Denver Area Ed. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 
U.S. 727, 749 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 131. Id. at 208 (“[I]t is entirely reasonable for public libraries to . . . exclude certain 
categories of content, without making individualized judgments that everything they do make 
available has requisite and appropriate quality.”). 
 132. Id. at 208–09. 
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“disable” a filter altogether “to enable access for bona fide research 
or other lawful purposes.” The Solicitor General confirmed that a 
“librarian can, in response to a request from a patron, unblock the 
filtering mechanism altogether,” and further explained that a 
patron would not “have to explain . . . why he was asking a site to 
be unblocked or the filtering to be disabled.”133 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that because libraries’ 
provision of Internet access did not constitute a traditional or 
designated public forum, strict scrutiny did not apply, and CIPA 
readily satisfied the scrutiny applicable to content-based restrictions 
of speech within non-public forums.134 
D. The Child Online Protection Act—Rounds 2 and 3 
The Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of COPA 
for the second time in 2004. In Ashcroft v. ACLU,135 the Court held 
that the ACLU was likely to prevail on its claim that COPA facially 
violates the First Amendment because it is not the least restrictive 
alternative to advancing Congress’s compelling interest.136 Because 
COPA embodies a content-based restriction on speech subject to 
strict scrutiny, the Government was required to meet its burden of 
establishing that the ACLU’s proffered alternatives, including user-
based software filters, were not as effective as and were less speech 
restrictive than COPA. As the Court explained in Reno v. ACLU,137 
a statute that “effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that 
adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one 
another . . . is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be at 
least as effective in achieving the [statute’s purpose.]”138 The 
Supreme Court held that the Government failed to prove that it 
would be likely to defeat the ACLU’s claim that software filters 
constitute a less restrictive alternative to COPA.139 Contrasting the 
efficacy and speech restrictiveness of software filters and COPA, the 
Supreme Court credited the district court’s analysis of the greater 
 
 133. Id. at 209 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted; emphasis added). 
 134.  Id. at 214. 
 135. 542 U.S. 656 (2004). 
 136. Id. at 666. 
 137. 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 138. Id. at 874. 
 139. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 666–67. 
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efficacy of software filters compared to COPA’s criminal 
prohibitions.140 Accordingly, the Court concluded that “blocking or 
filtering technology may be at least as successful as COPA would be 
in restricting minors’ access to harmful material online without 
imposing the burden on constitutionally protected speech that 
COPA imposes on adult users or Web site operators.”141 
Justice Kennedy explained that the efficacy of software filters 
likely rendered COPA unconstitutional both because filters were less 
restrictive than COPA and because filters were likely more effective 
than COPA.142 First, “filters are less restrictive than COPA [because] 
[t]hey impose selective restrictions on speech at the receiving end, 
not universal restrictions at the source.”143 Accordingly, adults 
without children who wish to receive harmful-to-minors content can 
readily obtain such content by not using filters, and even adults with 
children who employ filters can simply disable the filters to access 
such content.144 Most importantly, Justice Kennedy held, because a 
filtering regime does not “condemn as criminal any category of 
speech,” the potential chilling effect on sexually-themed speech is 
greatly diminished under a filtering regime as compared to COPA’s 
scheme.145 
Justice Kennedy explained further that filters are likely more 
effective than COPA because their use can prevent minors from 
viewing pornography that originates outside of the United States and 
from accessing pornographic content that is available via Internet 
avenues other than the World Wide Web.146 Because COPA extends 
only to content that originates within the United States, it only 
reaches approximately 60% of harmful-to-minors content (the other 
40% of which originates overseas).147 Filters, in contrast, which are 
imposed on the receiving end, can block harmful-to-minors content 
regardless of its geographic origin, and extend to all forms of 
Internet communication, not just material originating from the 
 
 140. Id. at 666–73 
 141. Id. at 663 (quoting COPA I, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 495 (E.D. Pa. 1999)).  
 142. Id. at 665–70. 
 143. Id. at 667. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 657. 
 146. Id. at 667. 
 147. Id. 
NUNZIATO.FIN 2/4/2008 9:38 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2007 
1566 
World Wide Web.148 As Justice Kennedy noted, the Commission on 
Child Online Protection, created by Congress under the COPA 
statute, unambiguously found that filters were more effective than 
the adult verification schemes embodied in COPA.149 
Justice Kennedy acknowledged that filters were not a perfect 
solution because they inevitably underblock and overblock content. 
Nevertheless, he concluded that the Government failed to satisfy its 
burden of showing that filters were less effective than COPA.150 
Accordingly, he concluded that it was not an abuse of discretion for 
the district court to preliminarily enjoin the statute pending a full 
trial on the merits, in which the Government would be required to 
prove that filters were not less restrictive than COPA in order to save 
COPA from being permanently enjoined.151 
Justice Breyer, in his dissent joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justice O’Connor, criticized the burden that the majority 
imposed upon the Government of proving that filtering software was 
a less restrictive alternative than COPA.152 According to Justice 
Breyer, filtering software should not be analyzed as an alternative to 
COPA because it is not an “alternative legislative approach.”153 
Rather, he explained, filtering software is 
part of the status quo, i.e., the backdrop against which Congress 
enacted [COPA]. It is always true, by definition, that the status 
quo is less restrictive than a new regulatory law. It is always less 
restrictive to do nothing than to do something. But “doing 
nothing” does not address the problem Congress sought to 
address—namely, that, despite the availability of filtering software, 
children were still being exposed to harmful material on the 
Internet.154 
Justice Breyer criticized the majority for requiring the 
Government to disprove the existence of “magic solutions”—
filtering regimes in which, for example, the “Government [gave] all 
parents, schools, and Internet cafes free computers with filtering 
 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 668. 
 150. Id. at 670. 
 151. Id. at 660–73.  
 152. Id. at 688 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 153. Id. at 684 (emphasis omitted). 
 154. Id. 
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programs already installed, hire[d] federal employees to train parents 
and teachers on their use, and devote[d] millions of dollars to the 
development of better software.”155 It is unclear, however, why such 
an alternative would be infeasible. In regulating this area in the past, 
the government has compared blanket prohibitions on sexually-
themed content to potential technological solutions that would 
empower parents and require them to exercise control over such 
content, and it has struck down such blanket prohibitions in favor of 
technological solutions for parents.156 Furthermore, in the Internet 
context, Congress has already strongly encouraged the use of filters 
by public schools and libraries under CIPA,157 and it could enter or 
intervene in the filtering software market to facilitate the translation 
of obscenity and harmful-to-minors constitutional standards to the 
software code that implements content filtering. 
The Government attempted to meet its burden of sustaining the 
enforceability of COPA in a full trial on the merits held in November 
2006 in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.158 In attempting to 
meet this burden, the Government focused primarily on the two 
aspects of the comparative analysis of COPA and the filtering 
schemes that were emphasized by Justice Kennedy.159 First, the 
Government contended that COPA can be enforced against foreign 
Web site operators, either directly under multilateral treaties or 
indirectly by regulating the credit card companies that facilitate 
access to such content originating overseas under merchant 
agreements that require foreign merchants selling goods and services 
to U.S. customers to comply with laws that are unique to the United 
States (such as COPA).160 Accordingly, the Government contended 
that filtering schemes (that filter sexually-themed content originating 
within and outside the United States) are not comparatively more 
effective than COPA on the grounds of their international reach.161 
Second, the Government contended that a filtering scheme 
would not constitute a less restrictive and equally effective alternative 
to COPA because filters substantially underblock and overblock 
 
 155. Id. at 688. 
 156. Id. at 670. 
 157. 47 U.S.C. § 254 (2000). 
 158. ACLU v. Gonzalez, 478 F. Supp. 2d 775 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
 159. Id. at 810–11. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 811. 
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material and are often implemented improperly and ineffectively.162 
The Government presented the results of studies conducted by its 
experts using the best filters on the market as applied to three large 
representative data sets.163 These experts concluded that if 
underblocking by filtering is minimized, then overblocking is 
prevalent, and vice versa, because configuring a filter to block all 
harmful-to-minors material inherently overblocks, while configuring 
a filter to allow receipt of all non-harmful-to-minors material 
inherently underblocks.164 The Government contended further that, 
in addition to the underblocking and overblocking inherent in the 
use of even the best filtering software, minors are frequently able to 
circumvent such filters with the assistance of information that is 
readily available on the Internet.165 COPA, by contrast, which 
imposes restrictions on the source, cannot be circumvented, and is 
therefore more effective than a filtering scheme.166 
The ACLU responded that, despite the Government’s arguments 
that COPA was applicable to Internet content originating overseas, 
there were insurmountable obstacles to granting extraterritorial 
effect to COPA.167 First, it would likely be difficult to establish 
personal jurisdiction over a foreign Internet content provider.168 
Even if the Government could establish jurisdiction, a criminal 
sanction imposed under COPA would be difficult or impossible to 
enforce in another country.169 Extradition would not be a viable 
option in the COPA context because many extradition treaties 
require the offense to be a crime both in the United States and in the 
country from which the individual is being extradited, which would 
likely not be the case with a COPA violation. Thus, the ACLU 
argued, end-user filters are more effective than COPA because they 
can block the forty percent of harmful-to-minors content that 
originates overseas, while COPA cannot extend to such content.170 
Finally, the ACLU contended that filters are more effective than 
 
 162. Id. at 794. 
 163. Id. at 795–96. 
 164. Id. at 794–97. 
 165. Id. at 794. 
 166. Id. at 813. 
 167. Id. at 810–11. 
 168. Id. at 811. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 810–811. 
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COPA because, while COPA applies only to World Wide Web 
content, filters can also block other types of harmful Internet 
communications, including communications via email, chat, instant 
messaging, peer-to-peer, streaming audio and video, Voice over 
Internet Protocol, and television over the Internet.171 
The district court essentially sided with the ACLU. First, it 
concluded that COPA was not narrowly tailored to serve Congress’s 
compelling interest in protecting minors from exposure to sexually-
explicit material on the World Wide Web because it is overinclusive, 
in that it prohibits far more speech than is necessary to advance the 
government’s interest, and because it is underinclusive, in that it 
does not reach the significant amount of sexually explicit online 
material that originates overseas.172 Nor do the statute’s affirmative 
defenses render it narrowly tailored. Age verification as currently 
implemented is ineffective and/or unduly burdens protected 
speech.173 Age verification tools are not widely available or 
implemented, and content providers cannot effectively verify age 
through credit cards and debit cards because (1) card issuers prohibit 
their use to verify age, (2) a substantial number of minors have access 
to such cards, and (3) many adults do not own credit cards or are 
unwilling to provide credit card information online.174 
The district court also agreed with the ACLU’s argument that 
COPA is not the least restrictive alternative available and that 
filtering technologies were less restrictive and at least as—and likely 
more—effective than COPA in restricting minors’ access to harmful 
material online.175 First, COPA embodies criminal provisions, which 
unavoidably chill some protected speech, while legislation relying on 
filtering would not similarly embody fines or prison sentences.176 
Congress could enact programs to promote and support the use of 
filtering software and provide parents with the ability to monitor 
their children’s Internet access, without subjecting protected speech 
to severe criminal penalties, as COPA’s scheme does.177 Second, 
filters are at least as—and likely more—effective than COPA in 
 
 171. Id. at 815. 
 172. Id. at 810. 
 173. Id. at 811–13. 
 174. Id. at 812. 
 175. Id. at 813–16. 
 176. Id. at 813. 
 177. Id. at 814. 
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restricting minors’ access to harmful Internet speech.178 Filters can 
reach substantially more overseas-originating sites than COPA and 
can also reach a wide array of Internet content, whereas COPA is 
arguably limited to domestic sites using the HTTP or successor 
protocols.179 Finally, the court concluded that COPA was 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.180 
The Government appealed the district court’s decision to the 
Third Circuit, and the Supreme Court will likely grant certiorari to 
weigh in for the third time on the constitutionality of COPA (this 
time, with the benefit of a full trial on the merits). The Court’s 
decision (like the district court’s) will likely rest on the comparative 
efficacy and speech-restrictiveness of COPA and software-filtering 
schemes. 
E. Lessons Learned 
Several overarching themes emerge from the above analysis of 
the courts’ scrutiny of the three major statutes restricting minors’ 
access to sexually-themed Internet expression. First, courts prefer 
regulations that empower the end user to screen out harmful content 
on the receiving end, rather than regulations punishing the content 
provider for failing to initially screen out harmful content. As Justice 
Kennedy explained in Ashcroft v. ACLU, “filters are less restrictive 
than COPA [in that] they impose selective restrictions on speech at 
the receiving end, not universal restrictions at the source.”181 Second, 
with regard to regulations empowering the end user to screen out 
harmful content on the receiving end, courts will look carefully at 
whether the choice to screen or filter can be easily undone (so that 
adults can ultimately access the full panoply of speech that they have 
a constitutional right to access).182 Third, in applying strict 
constitutional scrutiny to these statutes, courts will seriously inquire 
into whether there are less speech-restrictive alternatives for 
advancing the statute’s goal. If the ACLU can identify one such 
 
 178. Id. at 813–14. 
 179. Id. at 815. 
 180. Id. at 821. 
 181. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 667 (2002). 
 182. See United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 196 (2003) (upholding CIPA 
because librarians could unblock filtered material or disable the Internet software filter without 
significant delay on an adult user’s request). 
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alternative, a court will likely strike down the statute. With these 
principles in mind, I turn to an analysis of the constitutionality of the 
proposed Internet Community Ports Act. 
IV. THE INTERNET COMMUNITY PORTS ACT 
One novel type of solution for restricting minors’ access to 
sexually-themed Internet content is embodied in the proposed 
Internet Community Ports Act (ICPA). ICPA capitalizes on the fact 
that Internet content is transmitted via different ports or channels.183 
If the dissemination of harmful-to-minors content can be restricted 
to certain ports or channels, then users who choose not to receive 
such content can configure their Internet access, with the help of 
their ISPs, to ensure that they do not receive communications via 
such restricted ports or channels.184 Under the port filtering scheme 
contemplated in ICPA, only users who wish to receive 
adult/harmful-to-minors Internet content will be able to receive it, 
while Internet users who choose to receive only content that is 
designated not harmful to minors will be shielded from adult 
content.185 Below, I analyze the implementation and constitutional 
implications of such a filtering scheme. 
A. Internet Ports 
ICPA’s regulatory scheme depends upon the ability to segregate 
Internet content for dissemination on different Internet ports. All 
Internet communications travel over ports, which are virtual 
pathways used to direct various types of Internet activity and content 
to their appropriate destinations.186 Unlike USB ports or parallel 
ports on a computer, these Internet ports have no physical existence. 
Rather, an Internet port is a special number present in the header of 
 
 183. See Preston, supra note 6, at 1471 app. § V(44) (defining “Port(s)”); § V(9) 
(defining “Community Port(s)”); § V(41) (defining “Open Port(s)”); see also CP80 
Foundation, Internet Community Ports Act of 2007, 
http://www.cp80.org/resources/0000/0013/Internet_Community_Ports_Act.pdf. Cheryl 
Preston, Professor of Law at Brigham Young University Law School, and the CP80 
Foundation created and advocate adoption of the ICPA. At the time of writing, the ICPA has 
not yet been introduced in either house of Congress. 
 184. Cheryl B. Preston, Zoning the Internet: A New Approach to Protecting Children 
Online, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1417, 1431–34. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 1427–31. 
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each data packet of an Internet communication that is used to map 
that data packet to a particular destination.187 Data packets are 
routed from one port through an ISP to another port on the 
intended recipient’s computer. There are 65,535 possible ports for 
Internet communications, only a minor subset of which are 
commonly used.188 By convention, certain ports are used for certain 
types of Internet traffic. For example, ports 80 and 8080 are used for 
Web page transmission over hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP 
traffic); Port 110 is used for POP3 email traffic; Port 5190 is used 
for AOL Instant Messenger traffic; Port 443 is used for encrypted 
transmission of credit card and other secure data; and Port 666 is 
used by the Internet game Doom.189 As with many other types of 
standards on the Internet, the use of Internet ports is largely 
governed by convention among the Internet community. 
The organization responsible for registering and allocating port 
numbers is the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), which 
is operated by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (ICANN), neither of which are governmental entities.190 
Rather, these entities are sui generis Internet standard-setting and 
policy-making bodies responsible for many aspects of Internet name 
and number management.191 Among other functions, IANA is 
responsible for maintaining a list of port assignments and uses. Ports 
0–1023, designated the “Well Known Ports,” are assigned by IANA 
and generally reserved for system processes.192 Ports 1024–49,151 
are designated the “Registered Ports” and are coordinated and 
approved by IANA.193 Ports 49,152–65,535 are designated 
“Dynamic” or “Private Ports” and are unregulated by IANA.194 
The designation of which port an Internet communication will 
travel through is quite simple and straightforward and amounts to a 
 
 187. See Preston, supra note 6, at 1471 app. § V(33) (defining of “Port(s)”). 
 188. See Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, Port Numbers, http://www.iana.org/ 
assignments/port-numbers.  
 189. Port Numbers, supra note 188. 
 190. See Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, http://www.icann. 
org/new.html. For a discussion of the non-governmental status and policy-making functions 
of ICANN, see Dawn Nunziato, Freedom of Expression, Democratic Norms, and Internet 
Governance, 52 EMORY L.J. 187 (2003). 
 191. Nunziato, supra note 190. 
 192. Port Numbers, supra note 188. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
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few characters inserted in the HTML code associated with that 
content. For example, to direct an HTML file associated with the 
Smithsonian’s Web site, www.si.edu, to be transmitted over Port 
50,000, the following code could be inserted in the HTML code 
associated with the Web site: <a href=http://www.si.edu:50,000/ 
index.html>. 
Content providers also have the ability to designate an individual 
component of their Web site, such as a particular image file, for 
transmission via a particular port. In order to direct only a particular 
image file (for example, image.gif on the www.si.edu Web site) to be 
transmitted and displayed on Port 50,000, the following code could 
be used: <img src=http://www.si.edu:50,000/image.gif>. 
It is a relatively straightforward process to block receipt of 
Internet communications over certain ports. Using standard firewall 
software, an Internet user or ISP can restrict the receipt of Internet 
communications that are transmitted via designated ports. For 
example, if a user (directly or via her ISP) chooses to restrict all 
content transmitted via ports 50,000–65,535, she could employ 
standard software to restrict her access to such content made 
available through such ports. Unlike user-based filtering software, 
which users (especially teenage users) frequently disable with ease, 
port-filtering software imposed at the ISP level is much more 
difficult to circumvent. 
B. The Internet Community Ports Act 
In an effort to capitalize on the availability of a vast number of 
heretofore unutilized Internet ports, as well as on the ease with 
which Internet content can be channeled to designated ports, 
proponents of ICPA developed a proposal for regulating access to 
certain sexually-themed Internet content based on Internet port 
technology. ICPA would operate by setting forth a scheme for 
channeling or filtering such content to certain ports and away from 
those who choose not to access such content.195 
First, the regulatory scheme contemplated by ICPA would 
require the FCC to designate (1) a certain subset of available 
Internet ports as “Open Ports,” over which all legal (e.g., non-
obscene) Internet traffic could be disseminated, and (2) another 
 
 195. Preston, supra note 184, at 1431–34. 
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subset of Internet ports known as “Community Ports,” which would 
be restricted for the transmission of content that was not harmful to 
minors.196 ICPA defines “Harmful to Minors”197 content in the same 
way that “Harmful to Minors” content is defined under COPA,198 
which definition was upheld by the Supreme Court in its first 
consideration of COPA.199 The Act would make it a crime for a 
content publisher to make “knowingly and with knowledge of the 
character of the material, . . . by means of any Community Port, 
make[] or cause[] to be made any Communication that is Obscene 
Child Pornography, or Harmful to Minors.”200 While the Act also 
provides separately for the liability of Internet Service Providers,201 I 
focus my analysis primarily on the direct liability of content 
publishers. 
ICPA essentially operates by creating two zones for Internet 
speech: an adult zone for all First Amendment-protected content, 
and a minor zone for all content protected by the First Amendment 
and not harmful to minors. If we assume that content providers are 
able to determine which content properly belongs in which zone, 
then the burden ICPA imposes on them, to direct appropriate 
content to the appropriate zone, is insubstantial. That is, if we 
assume a state of affairs in which (1) the proposed statute’s mandate 
pre-existed the creation of the HTML code for each Web site and 
(2) all Internet Web sites are either clearly harmful to minors or 
 
 196. See supra note 183. 
 197. ICPA defines “Harmful to Minors” any communication that: 
i. the average adult, applying a contemporary national standard, would find, 
taking the Communication as a whole, is designed to appeal to, or is 
designed to pander to, the prurient interest; 
ii. depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently offensive with 
respect to Minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an 
actual or simulated normal or perverted sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of 
the genitals or post-pubescent female breast, or describes or depicts 
Sexually Explicit Conduct; and 
iii. taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value 
for Minors. 
Preston, supra note 6, at 1471 app. § V(22). 
 198. 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2000). 
 199. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 579–81 (2002). 
 200. Preston, supra note 6, at 1471 app. § II(1). The statute defines Content Publisher 
as “any person who Transmits, publishes [or] broadcasts . . . a Communication,” id. § V(12), 
where the Communication, in turn, includes “all data types and materials [transmitted via the 
Internet, including] text, images, graphics, . . . video, [and] audio.” Id. § V(8). 
 201. Id. § II(1). 
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clearly not harmful to minors, then the burden on the content 
provider seems minimal. The content provider responsible for each 
Web site need only insert a small line of code in the site’s HTML 
code at the time of the Web site’s creation to designate the type of 
port—Open or Community—over which such content would be 
made available. Because ICPA appears to impose minimal burdens 
on content providers in designating their content for the adult zone 
or the minor zone, proponents of ICPA might prevail on the courts 
to scrutinize the proposed Act as a zoning law subject to less than 
strict scrutiny. Because the Act arguably channels but does not 
restrict or burden speech based on content, proponents may contend 
that the Act merely regulates the place or manner in which speech is 
communicated and that the Act is therefore properly subject to 
reduced scrutiny as a time, place, or manner regulation of speech. 
Proponents may contend that ICPA operates in much the same 
way as real-space zoning laws that have been upheld by the Supreme 
Court. As Justice O’Connor explained in her concurrence/dissent in 
Reno v. ACLU,202 the Court has upheld real-space zoning laws that 
create separate adult zones and minor zones, where such laws do not 
“unduly restrict adult access to [adult] material; and [] minors have 
no First Amendment right to read or view the banned material.”203 
Zoning laws that prohibit minors from accessing harmful-to-minors 
material, while allowing adults unburdened access to such material, 
have been upheld when applied to real space. If legislators could 
accurately map such a regulatory regime onto cyberspace, as Justice 
O’Connor envisioned in Reno v. ACLU, the Court would likely 
uphold that scheme as well. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has upheld real-space zoning laws 
that regulate the place in which adult content can be disseminated 
and has subjected such zoning laws to reduced scrutiny. In City of 
Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., for example, the Court upheld a 
city zoning ordinance prohibiting such theaters from operating near 
schools, residences, parks, and similar locations, against an adult 
theater’s challenge.204 The Court held that because the ordinance did 
not ban such adult speech altogether, but rather sought to channel it 
into certain locations, the ordinance was properly construed as a 
 
 202. 521 U.S. 844, 886 (1997) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 203. Id. at 887–88. 
 204. City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986). 
NUNZIATO.FIN 2/4/2008 9:38 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2007 
1576 
time, place, or manner regulation subject to reduced scrutiny.205 
Such regulations are acceptable, the Court held, as long as they “are 
designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and do not 
unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication.”206 Under 
the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, however, 
time, place, and manner restrictions are subject to reduced scrutiny 
in part because they are content-neutral. A regulation that zones 
speech based on its content may be a “place” regulation but is not 
necessarily a content-neutral one. In construing the City of Renton’s 
regulation of sexually-explicit theaters, the Court wrestled with the 
issue of whether the ordinance was content-neutral or content-based 
and ultimately determined that because the City did not intend to 
suppress or restrict the message communicated by such theaters in 
enacting the ordinance, the ordinance did not regulate speech on the 
basis of its content.207 Quoting Justice Powell’s opinion in Young v. 
American Mini Theaters, Inc.,208 the Renton Court observed that 
“[i]f [the City] had been concerned with restricting the message 
purveyed by adult theaters, it would have tried to close them down 
or restrict their numbers, rather than circumscribe their choice as to 
location.”209 
Accordingly, the Renton Court rejected the conclusion that the 
ordinance was content-based and subject to strict scrutiny, holding 
instead that the regulation, like the one at issue in Young, involved 
“a decision by the city to treat certain movie theaters differently 
because they have markedly different effects on their 
surroundings.”210 In particular, the Court credited the City’s findings 
that the un-zoned presence of adult theaters had an adverse effect on 
neighborhood children and contributed to declining neighborhood 
property values, both of which the Court found to be secondary 
effects of adult theaters on their surroundings, not primary effects of 
the content of such speech.211 Concluding that the Renton ordinance 
was aimed at reducing these harmful secondary effects and not at 
 
 205. Id. at 48–49. 
 206. Id. at 47. 
 207. Id. at 48, 51. 
 208. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
 209. Renton, 475 U.S. at 48 (quoting Young, 427 U.S. at 81 n.4 (Powell, J., 
concurring)). 
 210. Id. at 49 (quotation marks omitted). 
 211. Id. at 48. 
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suppressing the content conveyed by adult theaters, the Court found 
that the regulation was properly categorized as a content-neutral 
time, place, or manner regulation that was constitutional because it 
left open ample alternative avenues for communication (five percent 
of the City’s area)212 and served substantial government interests 
(reducing adverse effects on neighborhood children and ameliorating 
neighborhood blight).213 
The Renton and Young line of cases has been strongly criticized 
for classifying the regulations involved as content-neutral and for 
applying reduced scrutiny to the regulations.214 The zoning 
regulations at issue in these cases undeniably subject sexually-explicit 
speech to greater burdens than non-sexually-explicit speech.215 
Despite these trenchant criticisms, these real-space zoning cases 
appear to remain viable precedents from which to defend the 
constitutionality of statutes that regulate the place or manner of 
distribution of sexually-themed expression based on the effects of 
such expression on minors. Indeed, proponents of ICPA have a 
stronger argument in defense of the proposed statute’s 
constitutionality than the proponents of the real-space zoning 
ordinances at issue in Renton and Young. ICPA’s manner of zoning 
speech leaves open far more alternative avenues for communication 
than the real-space zoning regulations upheld by the Court in 
Renton and Young. Considering that the vast majority of Internet 
content is currently disseminated via only one port (Port 80, the 
conventional port for HTTP traffic), ICPA’s proposed port 
limitation of sexually-themed Internet expression would easily satisfy 
the “ample alternative avenues of communication” component of 
this analysis. 
In supporting the constitutionality of ICPA based on the real-
space zoning line of cases, defenders of the statute would also need 
to identify and document the negative effects of “harmful-to-
 
 212. Id. at 53. 
 213. Id. at 50–51; see also City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000) (ban on 
completely nude dancing is aimed at secondary effects of such dancing, not at message 
expressed by dancers, and therefore the ban is subject to intermediate not strict scrutiny); 
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (same). 
 214. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of 
Speech: Problems in the Supreme Court’s Application, 74 S. CAL L. REV. 49, 60 (2000) 
(criticizing the Renton Court for confusing content neutrality with the question of whether the 
law is justified). 
 215. Id. at 60–61. 
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minors” speech by providing evidence of the effects of such 
expression on the psychological well-being of children. If defenders 
of the statute could convince the Court that the legislation does not 
aim at suppressing or restricting adult content because it conveys 
harmful ideas, but rather aims at channeling such content away from 
minors because of the psychological or other harms that result from 
minors’ early exposure to such content, they might convince the 
court that intermediate scrutiny is appropriate and that the statute 
survives such scrutiny. Surely, if protection against declining property 
values is a substantial government interest (as the Court found in 
Renton), preventing harm to children’s psychological well-being 
would constitute a substantial government interest as well. 
Accordingly, if defenders of the proposed statute were able to 
convince the Court to scrutinize the statute as a content-neutral 
regulation aimed at reducing the harmful secondary effects of 
sexually-themed expression on minors under the Young and Renton 
line of cases, the statute would likely withstand such scrutiny. 
If the reviewing court declined to subject ICPA to intermediate 
scrutiny and instead imposed strict scrutiny, the burdens imposed by 
ICPA on content providers and Internet end users, as well as the 
Court’s assessment of those burdens, would depend in part on which 
ports are designated for adult content and which are designated for 
minors’ content. If the default under ICPA were that all HTTP 
traffic would continue to travel over Port 80 (the conventional port 
for all HTTP traffic), then ICPA would merely impose an 
insubstantial (and optional) burden on providers of non-harmful-to-
minors content to direct their content to be disseminated via a 
Community Port. For example, under ICPA’s scheme, the publishers 
of the National Zoo’s Web site would be encouraged to disseminate 
their content via Community Ports so that those individuals 
choosing to receive only non-harmful-to-minors content could 
access the Zoo’s site with the assurance that no harmful-to-minors 
content would be available to them. 
Because ICPA imposes optional and technologically 
straightforward requirements, the burdens it imposes on content 
providers are minimal, but so are the likely benefits accruing from 
the statute. If the statute operates to leave the default port 
allocations in place and to require a Web site essentially to certify, 
upon pain of penalty, that its content is not harmful to minors (in 
order to designate transmission of such content via a Community 
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Port), then it is likely that very few sites will choose to do so. In this 
case, ICPA will probably share the same fate as the .KIDS.US 
domain name space, created in 2002 as a zone for guaranteed kid-
friendly content—free of violence, pornography, and other material 
inappropriate for minors. The Dot Kids Implementation and 
Efficiency Act of 2002216 directed the creation of the .KIDS.US 
domain space that would contain only content that is (1) not 
“harmful to minors,” as that term is defined in COPA, and (2) 
“suitable for minors” less than thirteen years of age.217 This Act 
defines content “suitable for minors” as content that is “not 
psychologically or intellectually inappropriate for minors,” and 
“serves the educational, informational, intellectual, . . . 
cognitive . . .[,] social, emotional, or entertainment needs of 
minors.”218 The Act charged NeuStar, the administrator of the U.S. 
country code top-level domain, with establishing and administering 
the .KIDS.US domain space, and with the responsibility of 
prescreening all content to determine whether it complies with the 
legal requirements for this domain space.219 
Although the .KIDS.US domain space imposed minor 
technological and financial burdens on content providers seeking to 
make their content available in this space, only a handful of content 
providers have made the determination that the burdens were 
worthwhile to assume; by all accounts, the .KIDS.US domain space 
is quite meagerly populated.220 And it is likely that ICPA would 
suffer the same fate if interpreted to require providers of not 
harmful-to-minors content to opt in to dissemination of such 
content via a Community Port, under pain of criminal penalties. 
Although the ICPA minors’ zone is slightly easier to opt into than is 
the .KIDS.US zone, and although it is easier for minors to hack 
around .KIDS.US content restrictions than to hack around the ICPA 
content restrictions, it is nonetheless likely that content providers 
 
 216. Dot Kids Implementation and Efficiency Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-317, § 157, 
116 Stat. 2766 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
 217. Id. § 157(j)(1)–(2). 
 218. Id. § 157(j)(5), 116 Stat, at 2770–71. 
 219. See generally id. § 157. 
 220. As of September 29, 2006, the top-level domain name “kids.us” contained twenty-
two Web sites. One of those Web sites is an index for the other sites. Two of those Web sites 
are defunct. 
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would find that the benefits of opting into this minors’ zone would 
not exceed its actual and potential costs. 
Consider, for example, the National Zoo’s likely cost-benefit 
analysis in determining whether to make its Web site available via a 
Community Port under ICPA. Although such a designation entails 
minimal financial and technological burdens, the publisher may 
nonetheless determine that the risk of penalty is too great and is not 
outweighed by the benefits of publishing its content via a 
Community Port. By publishing via a Community Port, the National 
Zoo must be prepared to certify that all content on its Web site—
thousands of images, videos, and text pages, some of which may be 
interactive or created by third parties real-time—is not harmful to 
minors. Given that the Zoo’s Web site may contain content that, for 
example, depicts or describes animals’ sexual activity (and given that 
such conduct could fall within the statutory definition of harmful-to-
minors content221), the publisher of the Zoo’s Web site might 
reasonably determine that the added benefit of publishing via a 
Community Port is not worth the risk. Proponents of ICPA might 
respond that a Web publisher like the National Zoo could easily 
designate any individual controversial image or video (e.g. the live 
Panda mating cam) on its Web site for dissemination via an Open 
Port, while the rest of the site’s content could continue to be made 
available via Community Ports. Once again, however, although this 
segregation of the Web site’s content is technologically feasible, the 
content provider would likely determine that the benefit of having 
part of its site accessible via Community Ports would not outweigh 
the costs of determining whether each individual item of content on 
its site was harmful to minors or not. 
If ICPA is interpreted so that the default HTTP port 80 is 
designated as a Community Port, such an interpretation would have 
different and more profound constitutional implications. It would 
require all Web sites with any content that is arguably harmful to 
minors to reconfigure all of their HTML code and re-designate the 
port for the transmission of such content (e.g., to designate a port 
other than Port 80). Although, as discussed above, the designation 
itself is not technologically burdensome, such a requirement would 
substantially and unconstitutionally restrict speech. 
 
 221. Preston, supra note 6, at 1471 app. § V(22). 
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Upon passage of ICPA, the vast majority of content providers 
may determine that it is simply not worth the risk to publish any 
content via Community Ports, and/or that it is too complicated to 
parse out their sites’ adult content from its minor content. 
Accordingly, most content providers would simply decide to 
designate all content for publication via Open Ports. This conclusion 
would apply with respect to Web sites that are interactive and that 
host content posted by third parties. The risk that third parties 
would post harmful-to-minors content cannot be ignored, and a 
Web site publisher would likely not risk penalties under the Act just 
for the benefit (if any) of making its content available via 
Community Ports. Because a great number of Web sites have some 
interactive component, ICPA may operate to encourage the vast 
majority of Web sites to publish via Open Ports. 
ICPA proponents may emphasize that the statute’s prohibitions 
apply only to content publishers who “knowingly and with 
knowledge of the character of the material” publish content that is 
harmful to minors via a Community Port222 and that a provider of an 
interactive Web site would not necessarily be charged with 
knowledge of the character of content hosted by third parties. 
Prosecutors might contend that at some point it is reasonable to 
charge a Web site publisher with knowledge of the character of 
content made available on its Web site. Given the uncertainties in the 
statute’s application, it is likely that an interactive Web site publisher 
would simply choose to publish all of its content via Open Ports, and 
avoid the risk inherent in publishing content via Community Ports. 
C. The User’s Perspective 
The above analysis suggests that, regardless of whether Port 80 
(the conventional port for HTTP Internet traffic) is designated as a 
Community Port or an Open Port under ICPA, the vast majority of 
Web sites will seek to avoid liability under ICPA and will simply 
choose to publish their content via Open Ports. The result will likely 
be similar to the experience under the .KIDS.US domain space, in 
which the majority of child-oriented Web sites have declined to risk 
liability for publishing content potentially harmful to minors and/or 
unsuitable for minors within this domain space. Accordingly, it is 
 
 222. See id. II(1). 
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likely that under ICPA, very few Web sites will choose to publish 
their content via Community Ports. For schools, libraries, and 
households that, pursuant to the ICPA regulatory scheme, instruct 
their ISPs to allow only Community Port content to be made 
available to them, ICPA will effectively operate to vastly limit the 
amount of Internet content available to such users. As a result, ICPA 
will substantially overblock harmful content, and as a result will not 
be narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling government interest 
of restricting minors’ access to harmful Internet content. Under this 
scenario, ICPA will substantially overblock users’ access to non-
harmful Internet content. 
Furthermore, once an Internet user has instructed her ISP to 
make only Community-Port content available to her, it will not be 
possible for anyone at any time to access Open-Port content on the 
user’s computer while that designation is in place. Thus, if a 
household with minor children elects to receive only Community 
Port content to restrict the children’s access to “Adult” content, it 
would not be possible for the parents to switch off this election and 
receive content via Open Ports once the children are asleep. User-
based filtering software allows multiple users of the same computer 
to have different types of access, and allows parents unfiltered access 
to Internet content at designated times of day (or all the time). In 
contrast, as contemplated under ICPA, the decision to receive 
communication only through Community Ports cannot be readily 
modified. Indeed, the Supreme Court, in analyzing the CIPA 
statute, placed substantial emphasis on the fact that the software 
filters could be removed upon an adult’s request so that adults were 
granted relatively easy access to the full panoply of Internet content 
that they had a constitutional right to access. ICPA’s screening of 
Internet content is not so easily reversible. Accordingly, although 
ICPA imposes minor technological and financial burdens on content 
providers by designating which types of ports can be used, it would 
likely operate to substantially restrict the speech available to those 
who receive content over Community Ports. For this reason, a 
reviewing court would likely find that ICPA operated to substantially 
overblock harmful speech. As a result, a court scrutinizing the 
constitutionally of ICPA under a strict scrutiny standard would likely 
find that there are less speech-restrictive alternatives—viz., user-
based software filters—available to advance Congress’s compelling 
interest of protecting minors from harmful, sexually-themed 
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expression on the Internet. Accordingly, ICPA would ultimately 
suffer the same fate as COPA, in that a reviewing court applying 
strict scrutiny to the statute would likely determine that it was not 
the least restrictive means of restricting minors’ access to sexually-
themed Internet expression because user-based software filters are 
less speech-restrictive—in that they overblock less constitutionally-
protected speech and can be turned off to allow adults to access the 
full panoply of Internet speech that they have a constitutional right 
to enjoy. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The above constitutional analysis of the three major statutes 
restricting minors’ access to sexually-themed Internet expression 
suggests three conclusions relevant to an assessment of 
constitutionality. First, courts have indicated a clear preference for 
regulation empowering end users to screen out harmful content on 
the receiving end over regulation punishing content providers for 
failing to screen out harmful content at its source. Because ICPA 
ultimately regulates and punishes content providers for failing to 
screen out harmful content at its source, it will be disfavored by the 
courts relative to regulations empowering end users to screen out 
harmful content on the receiving end. Second, even if ICPA is styled 
as a regulation empowering end users to screen out harmful content 
on the receiving end, courts will look carefully at whether the choice 
to screen or filter can be easily undone (so that adults can ultimately 
access the full panoply of speech that they have a constitutional right 
to access). ICPA’s port-filtering scheme operates between ISPs and 
end users to make it very difficult for end users to undo the decision 
to filter out content from certain ports and renders it virtually 
impossible for adults in a “Community Ports only” household to 
access the full range of Internet content that they have a 
constitutional right to access. Third, in applying strict constitutional 
scrutiny to ICPA, a court will inquire into whether there are less 
speech-restrictive alternatives for advancing the statute’s goal. If the 
ACLU can identify one such alternative, the court will likely strike 
down the statute. Because user-based software filters overblock 
substantially less constitutionally-protected speech than does ICPA, 
and because the decision to screen content with software filters can 
be easily reversed, a court will likely conclude that there are indeed 
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less speech-restrictive alternatives to ICPA and that ICPA is therefore 
unconstitutional. 
 
